UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA

MARK LENZI,

Plaintiff,

: Civil Action

No. 1:21-cv-01371-PTG-IDD

v.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF

STATE,

January 5, 2023

10:23 a.m.

Defendant.

TRANSCRIPT OF MOTION HEARING PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE HONORABLE PATRICIA TOLLIVER GILES, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

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APPEARANCES: (Cont.) Court Reporter: Scott L. Wallace, RDR, RMR, CRR Official Court Reporter United States District Court 401 Courthouse Square Alexandria, VA 22314-5798 Office: 703.549.4626 Cell: 202.277.3739 Email: Scottwallace.edva@gmail.com Proceedings reported by machine shorthand, transcript produced by computer-aided transcription.

1 MORNING SESSION, JANUARY 5, 2023 2 (10:23 a.m.).3 THE COURTROOM CLERK: Civil Action Number 1:21-cv-1371, Lenzi versus the Department of State, et al. 4 5 Counsel, please note your appearances for the record. 6 MR. SUAREZ: Good morning. This is Christopher Suarez 7 from Steptoe & Johnson on behalf of Plaintiff Mark Lenzi. With me is Mr. Kaplan, also of Steptoe & Johnson. 8 9 THE COURT: Thank you. Good morning. 10 MR. METZGER: Good morning, Your Honor. Attorney Matthew 11 Metzger on behalf of defendants, and with me is --12 THE COURT REPORTER: I'm sorry, I didn't understand you. MR. METZGER: I apologize. I'm joined by Ms. Catherine 13 14 Yang, trial attorney from the Department of Justice who is 15 arguing before the Court this morning. 16 THE COURT: Good morning. Ms. Yang, I'll hear from you 17 first. 18 MS. YANG: Thank you, Your Honor. Good morning. 19 THE COURT: Good morning. 20 MS. YANG: The issue before the Court on this motion is 21 whether plaintiff has fully and properly exhausted his claims 22 about an assignment, Frankfurt in 2021. We think the plaintiff 23 very clearly has not. As Your Honor knows, exhaustion requires more than just 24 25 initial claims concerning an administrative claim. It requires

the plaintiff to see the claim through to conclusion, meaning the employee has to continue to pursue the claim throughout the entire history, and then, if they choose to bring a lawsuit, has to timely bring claims in that federal case, too.

None of that happened here. When the EEO office did not accept the 2021 Frankfurt claim for investigation, the plaintiff never responded to be accepted. He responded on other claims, but he did not pursue the Frankfurt claims, and as a result those claims were never investigated --

THE COURT: This is our third motion to dismiss in this case.

MS. YANG: Yes.

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THE COURT: And so we've already -- we have just issues of exhaustion previously, not with respect to this Frankfurt 2021 claim but with respect to other claims, and so my first question is: How many of these allegations and amended allegation letters do we have from the Department of State? Are there three?

MS. YANG: There were two following the EEO complaints.

They have over time been amended, and so there have been a couple of different iterations of the acceptance letters.

I believe we have three acceptance letters that pertain to the EEO claims in 2021, and I think there were two or maybe three acceptance letters for the 2020 EEO claims.

THE COURT: Okay. So I don't have, the Court doesn't have all of the acceptance letters before me because in your prior

motions to dismiss where you made arguments with regards to exhaustion, the government relied on not only the letter, the prior acceptance letters and attached some of those, but also the plaintiff's original EEO complaint.

MS. YANG: Yes.

THE COURT: So you argued both. So, you know -- because when I looked at the letters that were attached to prior motions, for instance, I didn't see the Frankfurt -- the 2019 Frankfurt position referenced in those acceptance letters also, unless they were in another letter that the Court was not provided.

MS. YANG: I believe the Frankfurt assignment or the Frankfurt claims from 2019 were included in our previous acceptance letter. I believe that letter is before the Court, although I don't have -- I confess I don't have the previous pleadings with me.

THE COURT: Right, because I pulled the earlier pleadings, I think, from your first motion to dismiss, and so maybe this isn't the first letter, but it did not reference that prior Frankfurt. But still to that point, in challenging whether or not plaintiff sufficiently and properly exhausted claims, the government did also look to their EEO complaint. And I get what you are saying. I appreciate what you're saying, because not only do we have the issue of the letter from the Department of State where there was not a correction, we also have had -- this is potentially our third complaint: The original, and then we

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had a first amended, and then this is the second amended. So I get your point, but still, it seems like in prior motions the government didn't provide those.
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MS. YANG: That's true, Your Honor, and the reason for that is because there are two related but separate aspects of exhaustion. One aspect of exhaustion is the very traditional, did the complainant bring the complaint at all in the administrative charge? And if the answer is no, that, you know, the result from that is very straightforward. And so that was the exhaustion that we looked to and previously discussed, failures to promote, failure to accommodate, because those things have never been brought at all. So that's one aspect of exhaustion.

The aspect of exhaustion that we're dealing with today on today's motion is not whether someone has brought the claim initially, but whether they have seen that claim through to completion in the administrative review. That's different, but it is an established body of law within the Fourth Circuit: The Austin case is the Fourth Circuit decision, and the --

THE COURT: But it didn't involve merely correcting an acceptance letter.

MS. YANG: It's true that the Fourth Circuit case did not involve those exact facts, although the teaching from the Fourth Circuit authority is very clear that the claimant has to complete the administrative proceeding through completion for whatever

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     claims they're trying to bring, but we did also cite other cases
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     from outside of this circuit that very specifically deal with the
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     facts of addressing -- of making sure that all the claims that
     the claimant wants to bring in this case are presented in the EEO
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     letter.
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            THE COURT: But as you said, those cases are not Fourth
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     Circuit cases.
           MS. YANG: That is true.
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            THE COURT: And not all courts have gone that way,
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     correct?
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           MS. YANG: I'm sure that is also true, but, again, I think
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     the teaching from the Fourth Circuit case is very clear. It's
     just a simple proposition that a claimant has to see the process
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     through to completion, and that can happen a number of different
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     ways.
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            THE COURT: Now, the letter that the Department of State
     issued was in September.
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           MS. YANG: Yes.
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            THE COURT: And at what point did claimant indicate that
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     they were pursuing a court -- pursuing filing a complaint in
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     Federal Court as opposed to proceeding with the administrative
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     process? Does that --
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           MS. YANG: I believe the notice of withdrawal that
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     plaintiff attached as one of his exhibits is dated early
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     September before the EEO's acceptance letter.
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            THE COURT: So they indicated that they were withdrawing
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     and filing in Federal Court before the letter?
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           MS. YANG: Correct.
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           THE COURT: Okav.
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           MS. YANG: But, of course, when we see the actual
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     complaint that was filed in Federal Court, there's no allegations
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     or claims included about Frankfurt in 2021 when plaintiff amended
     his complaint last spring to add allegations about another
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     assignment. He again chose not to pursue the Frankfurt claims,
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     and he made that choice a third time in the fall when he told the
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     Court that he had no further amendments to make. We think that
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     under the law that we've cited in our papers and in which
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     plaintiff has not provided any contrary authority for, that this
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     is very clearly the epitome of failure to see a claim through to
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     completion, and that means that he has not fully and properly
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     exhausted his claims about Frankfurt in 2021.
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            I understand that plaintiff has made a number of arguments
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     in his opposition to try to get around this failure to exhaust,
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     and we addressed those fully in our reply brief. I'll be happy
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     to talk about them further if --
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            THE COURT: I want to go back to your position on the
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     failure to exhaust. They issued the letter that they were going
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     to withdraw prior to the acceptance letter coming from the
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     Department.
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           MS. YANG: I believe -- I believe that's correct.
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believe that's correct.
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THE COURT: Ms. Yang, Mr. Suarez can find that answer.

You don't need to look for it. And I agree with you that they
did have opportunities to raise it here sooner, but now they
haven't. You did not -- the government did not seem to advance a
prejudice argument with regard to the second amended complaint in
your pleadings. Is that fair?

MS. YANG: It is true that we did negotiate a {indiscernible} as to discovery, but we consented to the filing of the complaint, although, of course, we didn't {indiscernible} the exhaustion issue.

THE COURT: I understand your position.

MS. YANG: Thank you, Your Honor. I'll be happy to address any further questions Your Honor might have or in response to the argument that counsel makes.

I think the bottom line is that we think the issue begins and ends with the simple question of whether plaintiff saw these claims through to completion, and I don't think there can be any reasonable dispute that by failing to ensure that they were included in the EEO proceedings, by failing repeatedly to bring them in this case at various opportunities when they had the chance to bring them in the case, that our motion should be granted in this case.

MR. SUAREZ: Good morning, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Good morning.

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MR. SUAREZ: So just a few points. First on the exhaustion issue, as Your Honor pointed out, the only case they cite from the Fourth Circuit is the Austin case. It was not a precedential decision and is not on point. There is no Fourth Circuit precedent that suggests that just because something is not listed in the accepted allegations, that that somehow vitiates exhaustion. So there's no legal authority, precedential legal authority that they have a leg to stand on in terms of their argument.

And so, as a threshold matter, our position is that the motion to dismiss should be denied on that basis alone because, as Your Honor also alluded to, two of our client's EEO complaints, July 22nd and July 28th, referenced this retaliation/ discrimination issue with respect to the Frankfurt IMTS position in 2021 in detail.

And to Your Honor's prior rulings, Your Honor ruled that certain claims were not exhausted because things in Your Honor's view were not recited in those complaints, EEO complaints sufficiently. So here there's absolutely no dispute whatsoever that this -- that these particular claims are exhausted. have not presented any arguments to the contrary.

The second issue which is very important is, even if there were binding legal authority and you were to assume that there was some abandonment argument or that it was never even in the complaint at all, we cited the case law from the Fourth

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Circuit -- precedential case law from the Fourth Circuit -including the Sydnor case, the Smith case, the Chisholm case, which all stand for the proposition that like or related allegations that grow from the same factual circumstances, same corpus of facts, are actionable, even if they're not recited in the complaint at all. And here what we had was a position, Frankfurt IMTS in 2021, which the timeframe is in May and June of 2021, and that was right before the Krakow decision, a denial in July 2021. In that timeframe between 2019 and 2021 where Mr. Lenzi was on this Overcomplement status, the State Department at every turn was denying his overseas positions and overseas bids, which Your Honor had an initial hearing, was grounds for a discrimination and retaliation claims. And the proposition that that case law stands for is that if an investigation would have reasonably come up with this factual issue, that it can be erased, and we submit that because this factual scenario of the 2021 IMTS position was close in time to the Krakow position and then followed the same actors of the State Department, including the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, because it's the Bureau that continuously treated him in this manner and refused to give him overseas assignments. Just so Your Honor appreciates what happened in discovery,

this is a timeframe where they were directing him to a domestic assignment. They were saying you have to go into a domestic position, and so this is when Mr. Lenzi was trying to get more --

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you know, apply for other overseas positions and the continued denials that continued. And again smack dab in the middle, Sydnor stands for the proposition when you have similar timeframes, similar actors, similar claims. Again, it's the same counts: Discrimination, retaliation. It's the same thing. lot of the cases they cite in their brief were these kinds of cases where you have sex discrimination, and then you go to race, you switch completely in those counts, and that's not what we're doing here at all. It's a factual issue that is within the same discrimination or retaliation act advanced beyond the pleading stage before.

And we note that -- in the Smith case, it's particularly on point because in that case there were grounds of retaliation that were not listed in the complaint that changed -- that changed during the pleading stage, and the Fourth Circuit said we're going to let those advance because they are related. And that's what we have here. At the end of the day, Your Honor, this is about fundamental fairness. This was an issue that came up during discovery that they produced documents about that --

THE COURT: But you say that in your pleading that these are new facts, but they're not new facts. I mean, your client filed an EEO complaint based on them. So it's not new facts. You didn't find out about that because of their discovery or because of the deposition; you were already aware. You just didn't anticipate the legal theory that the government had.

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MR. SUAREZ: And candidly, Your Honor, we didn't appreciate the significance. In an ideal world -- and I just want to clarify one point for the record as well. representation was correct that the allegations of the first complaint were withdrawn prior to us coming to Federal Court, but we could not have brought this Frankfurt IMTS position, we could not have brought this with the original complaint.

So, in hindsight, I would have brought it in the first amended complaint, and I acknowledge that, Your Honor. think Your Honor articulated very clearly that we did bring it, and we brought it as soon as we appreciated the significance, and opposing counsel consented to the amendment, and all the prejudice factors were -- we discussed and handled during that discussion. We conceded to several discovery concessions on the {indiscernible} relating to this issue to allay any prejudice concerns.

And so our view is that if they really felt this was a futile amendment, they could have opposed, you know, the amendment itself with a futility basis. But our view is, because the law is so clear, that there is, you know, not a problem with exhaustion on the threshold matter and because a reasonable investigation would have come up with this.

In fact, I think the facts of the case bear that out. It's because we did discovery, and we deposed witnesses, and we asked that question, that, you know, these documents came to

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light. You're right that we in hindsight should have appreciated that sooner, but if you think from the perspective of an EEO investigator, they would have done the investigation, they would have focused on more witnesses, they would have considered all of that, and therefore it wouldn't have been the same investigation.

And one other point I want to make, Your Honor, that's significant is that we cite all of these cases, again, Fourth Circuit binding cases: Sydnor, Smith, Chisholm, and explain them in excruciating detail and also distinguish all of the cases.

And if you look at the government's brief where they address this reasonably related issue like they're related, there's a paragraph on page 5 of their brief, and in that paragraph they cite no affirmative case law to support their position, they don't rebut any of the Fourth Circuit authority that we cited, including again Stewart, Sydnor, Chisholm, all of those cases. And so not only do they not present any affirmative authority, they also do not rebut any of our Fourth Circuit authority which dictates that, you know, the interest of justice should permit this claim to proceed.

Again, in hindsight, we would have asserted it sooner, but given the posture we're in here, there's no 12(b)(6) issue in terms of the merits; there's no issue in terms of exhaustion; and because this is smack dab in the center of all these issues that occurred in 2019 and 2021, we believe that this should be permitted to go to trial so we can tell the complete story, and

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the government should not -- certainly should not be permitted to, you know, as we noted in the Kaleczyc deposition, he tried to suggest that, Oh, this is something that they offered that was overseas. But, again, they didn't follow through. They found another reason to deny him. So we think this is an important part of the trial story, in hindsight we should have mentioned it sooner, but --

THE COURT: But wouldn't you still have the opportunity to counter the government's evidence with respect to that through cross-examination and the questions you will ask?

MR. SUAREZ: We certainly still do, but we do not think that they have any legal leg to stand on in terms of this claim or with this aspect of the claim going forward, because it is, again, part of the corpus of factual allegations linked to this ongoing effort by the State Department to keep Mr. Lenzi in Overcomplement status, keep him in domestic positions, refuse to give him the opportunity to advance his career, as we have alleged and as Your Honor agreed was permitted to proceed.

So, unless Your Honor has further questions, for those reasons we believe the motion should be denied.

THE COURT: Okay. Ms. Yang.

MS. YANG: Thank you, Your Honor. I do have a couple of brief points in response. The first is that counsel criticizes the Austin decision that we were relying on which is the one that the plaintiff has to see the process through to completion.

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That's been unpublished. Certainly it's true it's been unpublished, but I think it's still Fourth Circuit authority and the Fourth Circuit has followed it. Among those cases which we cite in our papers is the Clark case from the Eighteenth District, and the facts of that case, although not identical, are quite similar with the case in which the plaintiff took an administrative appeal of certain of the claims that he had brought initially, but did not go through on certain other claims, and the district court held that the claims that he had not continued to pursue were not exhausted and therefore were dismissed from the case.

Counsel just now referred repeatedly to how the 2021 Frankfurt assignment is part of the corpus of their story, and we think that fundamentally misunderstands the exhaustion requirement for disparate treatment claims, which is a theory of a claim that plaintiff has pled in the case, disparate treatment claims require disparate acts and disparate acts that have been independently exhausted. A plaintiff can't just come in and say there's this umbrella of discrimination and retaliation, and anything that I say is discriminatory or retaliatory, and that's just not how it works for these kinds of claims.

Counsel also made an earlier argument that the 2021 Frankfurt assignment allegations are like or relate to the things that were exhausted and therefore they should come in that way. Again, as we demonstrated in our reply brief, the later argument

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that came in that they cited, the Sydnor case, the Smith case, the Chisholm case that counsel just referenced, that's a different standard that deals with a different issue. It deals with the first issue that I described to Your Honor in my opening, which is has the piece -- has the plaintiff brought the claims at all, did they make it part of the administrative claim at all? Again, we're not dealing with that issue here, we're dealing with a separate issue of did the claimant see the claims that they brought through to completion in the administrative proceedings. And again, there's a completely different --THE COURT: And your basis for saying they didn't see it

through is their failure to correct the letter?

MS. YANG: The failure to -- well, the actions that they took to demonstrate that they did not intend to pursue the claim through the administrative proceedings, which include not just failing to make sure that it's included in the letter, but making corrections to other -- demonstrating the intent to correct and make sure that those claims were properly framed for the administrative proceedings, but then not doing so with respect to the claims that are at issue here. I'm -- plaintiff's counsel says that we don't cite any affirmative --

THE COURT: Here's my issue with that. I understand and appreciate that the plaintiff failed to correct, but it is clearly stated in the -- I mean, that was the whole focus of the

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July 22nd complaint, and so the failure for -- and plaintiff did
not correct it. I hear you on that, but the agency failed to
include it. I mean, that was the whole complaint on July 22nd,
you know, the 12-pages with e-mails included and all of that, and
it just wasn't referenced. I think they just spoke -- I think it
was a mistake that they didn't focus also on the -- it seemed
like they only focused on the July 28th complaint, even though
they included the date for the July 22nd complaint, but there was
also a failure on the agency's part. I acknowledge and
appreciate your arguments in terms of plaintiff's failure to
correct it, but I have an issue with that, because to me there's
no reasonable justification for it not to have been included when
that was the whole basis of the July 22nd letter.
      MS. YANG: I appreciate Your Honor's concern, and I don't
know why it wasn't included. I don't know if it was because
there was a determination that those things weren't timely.
There could be any number of reasons why that was not included in
the record, including what's not part of the record as to why
they weren't, but certainly the undisputed --
      THE COURT: And I understand your position, and you're
not -- you can't really defend that, and I'm not asking you to,
but I'm letting you know what my concern is.
      MS. YANG: Right.
      THE COURT: And I see and I appreciate the cases that you
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have cited, but none of them are binding on me, and that is where

1 my concern is, the fact that it was clearly identified in that 2 letter. .3 MS. YANG: I understand, Your Honor. Again, I do think that the District Court decision from EDVA that we cited in our 4 5 papers does go to the issue, again not necessarily the second 6 claim issue, but certainly the issue that --7 THE COURT: And I've looked at the cases, and I definitely have considered that, as well as the Alston case and, you know, 8 9 your authority, the Judge Cacheris case, but still that is my 10 issue, and those cases don't have these facts. 11 MS. YANG: I understand Your Honor's concern. 12 THE COURT: And I read your cases from, you know, other courts where they have looked at acceptance letters and found 13 14 that the plaintiff's failure to correct those letters constituted 15 a failure to exhaust. I'm just saying I don't agree with that. 16 MS. YANG: I understand, Your Honor. The final point I would just end on, though, is that, you know, the -- what really 17 18 does distinguish this case from any other case I've seen dealing 19 with exhaustion issues is that the abandonment in this case 20 really is far more pronounced than the {indiscernible} --

THE COURT REPORTER: I'm sorry, counsel, I can't hear you.

MS. YANG: Is more pronounced because of the multiple opportunities to bring the Frankfurt claims in this case. Plaintiff's counsel says it was an oversight, we didn't mean to not include them, but, respectfully, Your Honor, that's not --

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that's not an excuse for exhaustion. The exhaustion requirements are there for a reason. They had the opportunity to do so. had three opportunities to do so well after they became aware of the facts and the allegations, and the timeliness requirements to correct them in this case. So, for these reasons and those we argued, we ask that the motion be granted.

THE COURT: Thank you.

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MS. YANG: Thank you.

THE COURT: The first issue I'm going to take up is the plaintiff's repleading portions of the case that I've already dismissed. Stop doing that. Your exceptions have been preserved, so don't keep including them in the complaint. if you can, don't.

The government's motion is granted with respect to that request. Those claims have already been dismissed with prejudice. Okay. Next, in terms of the 2021 Frankfurt IMTS, those allegations which have now been included in the complaint, this is the first time the Court is seeing those allegations. And I understand your argument with respect to, you know, the discrimination and retaliation claims that have been exhausted, and those are properly before the Court, and it includes these allegations with respect to the 2021 Frankfurt position, but allegations with respect to the position have not been included and before the Court before, and the government's arguments with regard to, you know, like -- I understand your argument with

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respect to witness in time for your first complaint, but, you know, it should have been in your first amended complaint are. And these aren't new facts, but for me that is really more related to a prejudice argument and not for an exhaustion with respect to plaintiff's failure to correct the acceptance letter. I understand the government's argument and the cases that you have cited with respect to exhaustion, but, as I said before, none of those are binding on the Court, and the acceptance letter is not a statutorily required procedure, and in this case plaintiff's EEO -- that July 22nd complaint, the whole focus of it was the 2021 Frankfurt or those allegations.

And I think that, you know, there is some blame with the agency and the reasonable -- the reason that those should have been -- that that should have been excluded in the acceptance letter, and plaintiff was advised in the letter to correct it and did correct a portion dealing with Krakow. I don't know why the plaintiff didn't correct or add in the Frankfurt claim for that point, but I also don't know why the agency didn't include it either, and I'm not going to find that plaintiff failed to bring the claim -- or failed to exhaust the claim when they adequately advised the agency of the claim. This may be a different position if the administrative process had proceeded more or plaintiff had done more affirmative steps to abandon the claim at the agency level, but that's not before me. Those aren't the facts in this case. And you've also correctly noted that they

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     didn't raise it at the first opportunity with that first amended
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     complaint, but you agreed that they could -- or you agreed that
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     the amendment provided that you could raise this argument or
     motion to dismiss on the exhaustion ground, but I'm not
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     particularly persuaded by the exhaustion argument at the agency
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     level. They didn't raise it initially in court before, but they
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     have raised it now, and I'm going to permit that. I'm not going
     to grant your motion to dismiss. I'm going to deny it for the
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     reasons that I stated, because I don't believe that that process
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     of correcting or the letter is statutorily required.
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            The plaintiff fully put the agency on notice about those
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     allegations, and to me there's no reason why it was not included
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     in that acceptance letter, and also given, the timing of it, that
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     that was also around the time that they were making the decision
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     to proceed to Federal Court, and so for those reasons I'm denying
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     your motion.
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           Now, have you all worked out what discovery will be with
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     respect to these claims or these allegations?
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           MS. YANG: Yes, Your Honor. Fact discovery is closed at
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     this point.
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            THE COURT: But have you all worked out whatever was
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     needed?
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           MR. SUAREZ: Yes, we have.
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           THE COURT: Thank you.
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           MS. YANG: Thank you.
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1	THE COURT: Your exceptions are preserved. We're	
2	adjourned.	
3	(Proceedings adjourned at 10:59 a.m.)	
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5	<u>CERTIFICATE</u>	
6	I, Scott L. Wallace, RDR-CRR, certify that	
7	the foregoing is a correct transcript from the record of proceedings in the above-entitled matter.	
8	/s/ Scott L. Wallace 1/10/22	
9	Scott L. Wallace, RDR, CRR Date	
10	Official Court Reporter	
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